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Division for the Studies and Oversight of Payment and Securities Settlement Systems
Post-market infrastructures execute critical functions — clearing and delivery versus payment — for
the performance of trades in financial assets. This makes them potential vectors for destabilisation
of the financial system in the event of malfunctions. Their impact on systemic risk warrants the
supervisory and oversight authorities' concern for analysing the various risks that such infrastructures
may incur and the efforts to establish a comprehensive set of recommendations for mitigating these
risks. This objective has now been achieved with the publication of the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations
in November 2001. These recommendations are intended to be universal in scope. In addition to
setting adequate standards, the relevant authorities, and central banks in particular, have extended
the scope of their responsibility in the field of maintaining financial stability by including the oversight
of post-market infrastructures. The statutes of the Banque de France have recently been amended in
such terms.
Securities clearing and settlement infrastructures are changing rapidly both in Europe, where
consolidation and sweeping rationalisation are taking place, and on the wider international scene.
Users expect greater functional integration of infrastructures, which should contribute to the expansion
of low-cost cross-border transactions and greater efficiency in securities processing. These changes
have prompted the relevant authorities to co-operate more closely in the regulation, prudential
supervision and oversight of the cross-border infrastructures being developed in Europe. With the
development of pan-European infrastructures in the Paris financial markets, the Banque de France
has played a very active role in enhancing co-ordinated oversight in conjunction with the other
relevant national authorities.
O
f the various securities infrastructures,
clearing and settlement, generally referred
to as post-market infrastructures, play a key
role in the securities processing chain. In addition,
the conditions under which these infrastructures
operate have major systemic implications.
Clearing is the second stage in the processing of
securities transactions following the trade itself. It
generally ensures the following functions: reception
and recording of individual transactions from the
trading system, computing clearing house members'
net positions, operation of risk-management
systems, substitution of the seller and the buyer by
the central counterparty, which takes on their
respective obligations (novation) to guarantee
performance on transactions, and, lastly, transfer
of net orders to delivery versus payment systems.
The “delivery versus payment” function is the last
stage in securities processing. It consists in the
settlement of the buyer's and seller's commitments118 FSR • Post-market infrastructures and financial stability  • November 2002
1|1 The clearing houses’ role:
risk management
To achieve multilateral netting, a clearing house
computes the net position of each market participant
by netting all of its transactions with all of the other
counterparties. Under a central counterparty
clearing arrangement, the clearing house fulfils the
technical function of computing the buyers' and
sellers' net positions, but it also takes legal
responsibility for their obligations through novation
and guarantees performance on their transactions.
Clearing houses with central counterparties make
a substantial contribution to improving risk
management in financial markets. Netting reduces
the net amounts of securities and funds to be
delivered, which lessens the market participants'
needs for securities and cash, and hence, liquidity
risks. Clearing houses also guarantee final
settlement of transactions, which reduces the
market participants' credit risk exposure.
Clearing houses do not necessarily handle all
securities trades. Whereas they usually handle
derivatives trades, their processing of trades on spot
markets varies. Yet, when a multilateral clearing
arrangement is used and the central counterparty
assumes the buyers' and sellers' obligations, then
risks are concentrated on central counterparties,
which may make them of critical systemic
importance, depending on how much of the trading
they handle. This is particularly true in Europe,
where the three main central counterparties are:
Clearnet especially for Euronext in Belgium, France,
the Netherlands and, soon, Portugal, the London
Clearing House, and Eurex Clearing for the German
and Swiss derivatives markets.
The use of clearing houses may also create moral
hazard, as market participants are tempted to
increase their trading activity recklessly since the
central counterparty bears the risks.
1| The role of clearing houses and securities
settlement systems
This means that the central counterparties' risk
management arrangements are critical for the
robustness of the systems and, more generally, for
financial stability.
and the posting of the entries that make the
transactions final, meaning the delivery of the
securities to the buyer and the payment of the
corresponding funds to the seller.
Securities processing chain for
a purchase of securities
(a) Investors: pension funds, insurance companies,  individuals, etc.
(b) Trades on the regulated market are cleared through the
clearing house.
(c) Only some of the OTC trades go through the clearing house.
(d) The clearing house:
– computes each participant’s net position by netting its
offsetting transactions,
– guarantees performance on transactions by acting as the
sole counterparty for sellers and buyers,
– conducts multilateral netting of participants’ positions.
(e) The securities settlement system provides delivery versus
payment and eliminates principal risk.
(f) The settlement bank holds the cash accounts.
(g) The central securities depository holds the securities accounts.
(h) The securities are recorded on the investor’s account with
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1|2 Securities settlement systems:
a secure framework for settling trades
In order to eliminate principal risk 1, securities trades
should be settled on a delivery versus payment basis.
This process ensures that the delivery of securities
to the buyer and the payment of the corresponding
price to the seller are simultaneous and reciprocal.
The systemic importance of securities settlement
systems lies in their contribution to the smooth
operation of financial markets, their close links to
payment systems and their key role in the
implementation of monetary policy operations.
They are used to transfer the collateral provided for
monetary policy operations and intraday credit
operations in payment systems.
– Securities settlement systems play a key role in
the smooth operation of markets by ensuring safe
and efficient settlement of trades in financial
instruments. The high value and the large
number of trades handled by the main systems
testify to the importance of their role.
– Secondly, the cash legs of trades processed by the
systems run by the central securities depositories
are settled across accounts held at the central
banks through their RTGS payment systems 2. This
means that payment systems and securities
settlement systems are highly interdependent.
Securities settlement systems also handle the
operational aspects of delivering the collateral
needed to obtain intraday credit from central
banks, which is essential for the smooth operation
of RTGS payment systems. Furthermore, the
settlement of the cash legs of securities trades
through payment systems could transfer risks to
these payment systems in the event of disruptions
in securities settlement systems.
– The importance of securities settlement systems
has risen in recent years following the increasing
use of securities by financial intermediaries as
collateral to guarantee credit operations. The
growing use of collateral concerns both market
financing (repos) and central bank credits, and,
more particulary, the central bank intraday credits
granted in the payment systems that compose
Target 3.
Securities constitute a significant proportion of the
assets used as collateral. Collateral is usually
delivered in the form of temporary transfers of
securities, including repos in France (pensions
livrées). These operations are processed by the
securities settlement systems, which means that
these systems are critical for the smooth operation
of payment systems and the implementation of
monetary policy. This explains why, in 1998, the
ESCB drafted nine standards that securities
settlement systems in the European Union must
comply with to be eligible for the settlement of
collateral for ESCB credit operations. The ESCB
assessed compliance with these standards to
determine whether systems are eligible to provide
services to the central banks in the ESCB. The
operators of systems that fell short of full compliance
were given recommendations and assessments have
been reviewed annually.
The number of cross-border collateralisation
operations increased with the introduction of the euro
and when the ESCB allowed counterparties in its
lending operations to use eligible securities located
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1 Principal risk is the risk that the seller of a security delivers a security but does not receive payment or that the buyer of a security makes payment
but does not obtain delivery. In such an event, the full principal value of the securities or funds transferred is at risk (CPSS/IOSCO definition).
2 RTGS: Real Time Gross Settlement.
3 Target is the cross-border system for wholesale payments in euros. It is made up of the interconnected domestic real time gross settlement systems
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2|1 Standards:
CPSS/IOSCO recommendations
There is nothing new about the regulators' concern
with post-market infrastructures. Back in the early
nineteen-nineties, the G10 central banks drafted a
set of recommendations for interbank clearing
systems that were published in the Lamfalussy
Committee Report.
In November 2001, this work was carried forward by a
joint group made up of the G10 Committee on Payment
and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical
Committee of the International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which drafted a
report known as the CPSS/IOSCO Report 4. This report
contains nineteen recommendations that are included
in the Financial Stability Forum's list of key standards.
They apply to securities in a very broad way and are
intended to apply to all existing arrangements for trade
confirmations, central counterparty clearing, securities
settlement and custody for both domestic and
cross-border transactions. The essential aspects of the
recommendations can be summarised as follows.
2| Policies to ensure the safety of securities clearing
and settlement systems
anywhere in the European Union as collateral. This
development is part of a more general increase in
cross-border flows throughout the world.
Under these circumstances, the links established
between the different securities settlement systems
are more exposed to spill-over risks in the event of
disruptions affecting one part of the network. This
new aspect has increased the systemic importance
of the European Union's securities settlement
infrastructure as a whole.
The scale and the nature of the activity of these
infrastructures mean that their functions are critical
for the implementation of the single monetary
policy. This requires special attention on the part
of oversight authorities, with the central banks being
the authorities most directly concerned. This
requirement is particularly clear, since securities
settlement systems, unlike payment systems, are
not backed up by a lender of last resort that could
produce the securities needed out of thin air in the
event of a default.
Use of collateral in the Eurosystem (December 2001)
Use of collateral with 











Legal soundness, a pillar of risk
management
Securities law is very complex and it is far from
harmonised either in Europe or on the broader
international scene. The CPSS/IOSCO Report calls for
the establishment of a sound legal framework, which
is a prerequisite for smooth operation of cross-border
securities settlement systems. This involves many
aspects, notably the laws governing the issuance,
ownership and transfer of ownership of securities, the
soundness of clearing and collateral arrangements, as
well as protecting settlement systems from the
enforcement of ordinary bankruptcy law provisions.
The pivotal role of central securities depositories
The use of central securities depositories is a key
recommendation for managing securities issues,
safekeeping and processing operations affecting
dematerialised securities. The primary function of
central securities depositories is a notary one. They
register all of the existing securities and the
transactions involving them. Their links to securities
4 The CPSS/IOSCO report can be viewed on the Bank for International Settlements' web site (www.bis.org)FSR• Post-market infrastructures and financial stability  • November 2002 121
monitoring compliance with participation criteria,
marking members' position to market at least once
a day, using deposit margin requirements and
issuing margin calls, along with management of
mutual clearing funds.
In view of the importance of the central
counterparties' tasks, extra prudential supervision
measures may be called for, in addition to those set
out in the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations. This
means that clearing houses acting as central
counterparties are required to apply for
authorisation as credit institutions (Article L 442-1
of France's Monetary and Financial Code). This is
done to ensure that they have adequate capital to
guarantee performance on transactions.
Delivery versus payment eliminates credit risks
Delivery versus payment can be defined as the
mutually binding legal, operational and technical
mechanism that ensures that delivery of securities
occurs if, and only if, payment of the price occurs.
This type of arrangement is critical for eliminating
principal risk and liquidity risk and for reducing
replacement cost risks 5 incurred in the settlement
of securities transactions. Since the publication of
the G30 recommendations in 1989, most securities
settlement systems have decided to offer their
participants delivery versus payment functions.
However, there are different delivery versus
payment models and not all of them offer the same
degree of protection. Participants in a system must
have a clear understanding of the advantages and
drawbacks of the different models so that
settlements can be carried out efficiently.
Minimising risk exposure
on the settlement agent
The use of central bank accounts for settlement of the
cash legs of transactions offers two key advantages:
no settlement risk, since funds transfers are made
across accounts at the central bank and easy transfers
since the assets held with the participants' respective
central banks are perfectly liquid.
But not all of the participants in securities settlement
systems are eligible to hold an account with the central
bank. Furthermore, some securities settlement systems
issuers and investors or investors' representatives
enable them to ensure that the number of securities
in the intermediaries' accounts always corresponds to
the number of securities posted in the issuers' records.
The numbers are matched to ensure that there is no
fictitious creation or destruction of securities. In
addition to acting as account holders, most central
securities depositories also perform settlement
functions for securities account owners (and
sometimes also cash account owners), which act both
on their own account and on behalf of their customers.
Sound risk management arrangements
are critical for central counterparties
The recommendations state that each market should
assess the potential benefits of using a clearing house
that acts as a central counterparty.
When a central counterparty is used, it should
implement appropriate risk management
arrangements. These would usually include
5 Replacement cost risk is the risk that a counterparty will have to replace a failed transaction by entering into a new one at a market price that is less favourable.
An example of legal problem:
the “zero hour” rule
As is the case for payment systems, the problem
with the “zero hour” rule is that a court or an
administrative authority may rule that a member
of a clearing house or a securities settlement
system is insolvent and then proceed to unwind
all of that member's transactions within the
systems in question. The effect is retroactive,
starting at zero hour on the day on which the
ruling is made.
At the European level, measures have been taken
to eliminate this risk, which could cause major
disruption in the systems. The Settlement Finality
Directive that has been in force in the European
Economic Area since November 1999 protects
securities clearing and settlement systems, along
with payment systems, from this risk. The
Directive states that orders entered in recognised
systems designated to the European Commission
shall be deemed to be irrevocable under the rules
of each system until the time when the bankruptcy
ruling becomes known to the system operator.122 FSR • Post-market infrastructures and financial stability  • November 2002
offer payment functions in different currencies.
However, for the time being, no mechanism is capable
of ensuring multiple-currency payments on central
bank accounts.
This is why it is recommended that risk exposure on
the settlement bank be strictly limited when
commercial bank money has to be used for funds
transfers. The risk control arrangements could take
the form of an institution with a specific status
(a “limited” or “single purpose” bank) with the sole
task of handling payments related to securities
settlement, thus eliminating possible interference from
other banking business.
If a settlement bank grants cash credit or securities
lending facilities to participants in a securities
settlement system to ensure smooth operations, it
must implement a risk management arrangement
combining credit limits for each participant and full
collateralisation of loans of securities or cash.
2|2 Oversight of post-market
infrastructures
Supervisors and regulators once seemed to have lost
interest in post-market infrastructures, since
attention was supposed to focus on the markets per
se and market participants. This is no longer the
case. The oversight of such structures has become
critical for the sake of financial stability, since they
now have proven systemic importance.
Current developments around the world and in Europe
more particularly, with concentration of custody,
consolidation of market operators and overhaul of
trading platforms, obviously raise important questions
for the authorities, such as defining the limits of their
supervisory scope, risk concentration and organising
co-operation between authorities.
Different delivery versus payment
models
There are three common models for delivery versus
payment systems:
– Model 1: Flows of securities and funds are
settled on a gross basis. This model can be
organised with real-time continuous
trade-by-trade processing, as is the case with
the irrevocable channel of the Euroclear France
RGV2 system. Transfers become final in
real-time, as they occur. Batch processing can
also be used, as is the case with Clearstream.
In this case, transactions are still settled on a
gross, trade-by-trade basis, but at specific times
during the day.
– Model 2: Securities transfers are settled on a
gross basis and funds transfers are settled on a
net basis. This is what happens in the revocable
channel of the Euroclear France RGV2 system.
– Model 3: Both securities transfers and funds
transfers are settled on a net basis, as is the
case in the Italian LDT system.
From the point of view of risk management, Model
1 offers the best protection, especially when
settlements are carried out in real-time, but this
system can entail fairly large cash requirements.
On the other hand, securities transactions under
Models 2 and 3 may not be settled until several
hours after trades are executed, and sometimes
not until the end of the day. The resulting risk
exposure may require the implementation of
complex protection arrangements or even
arrangements for unwinding transactions. These
circumstances create liquidity risks for the
participants.
Different models
of delivery versus payment in
central bank money
In technical terms, there are two main models of
delivery versus payment in central bank money:
– The first model operates across accounts held
with the central bank, but these accounts are
operated by the securities settlement system.
This means that funds transfers are settled
directly within the securities settlement system.
The French RGV system is based on this model.
– The second model establishes a link between
the securities settlement system and the RTGS
payment system operated by the central bank.
Final transfers of securities are made once the
central bank has confirmed completion of the
payment to the central depository.FSR• Post-market infrastructures and financial stability  • November 2002 123
The Banque de France is involved in major initiatives
relating to pan-European developments that have
implications for the Paris markets.
Oversight issues
The close relations that link payment systems and
central banks justify the special role that the latter
play in the oversight of post-market infrastructures.
First of all, central banks use securities settlement
systems to handle the delivery of securities put up
as collateral for their credit operations (intraday
credit for payment systems and monetary policy
operations).
Secondly, they act as the settlement agents for fund
transfers in most of the securities settlement
systems.
They also play an important part in maintaining
financial stability and their statutes increasingly
includes oversight duties with regard to securities
settlement systems and clearing houses for financial
instruments.
They are also bound to act as the lender of last resort
in the event of a major crisis affecting post-market
infrastructures.
The Banque de France’s tasks
The Emergency Economic and Financial Measures
Act of 11 December 2001 amended Article L 141-4 of
the French Financial and Monetary Code. The new
wording states that, “As part of the ESCB's tasks and
without prejudice to the powers of the Financial
Markets Council and the Commission bancaire
(Banking Commission), the Banque de France shall
ensure the safety of securities clearing and settlement
systems.” The Act thus gives the Banque de France
indisputable legal authority to oversee post-market
infrastructures and its responsibilities in this area are
derived from its own statute. This means that the
Banque de France is responsible for overseeing
securities clearing and delivery versus settlement
systems. Therefore, it assesses their compliance with
the principles set out in international standards, such
as the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations and the
upcoming European standards now being drafted by
the Committee of European Securities Regulators and
the ESCB.
In addition, since supervision of post-market
infrastructures in France is organised by function,
the Financial Markets Council acts as the regulatory
authority responsible for approving the rules
governing central securities depositories, settlement
systems and the clearing house. It also supervises
the enforcement of these rules. The Commission
bancaire ensures that the system operators are
financially sound when the law requires such
operators to be authorised as credit institutions or
investment firms, as is the case for the Clearnet
clearing house and securities custodians. This
division of powers gives rise to close co-operation
between the three relevant authorities.
3| Growth of cross-border transactions: implications
for the organisation and supervision of post-market
infrastructures
Growing integration of financial markets in recent
years has led to an expansion of cross-border
transactions and increasing demand for more efficient
securities infrastructures. This general trend is
promoting concentration of European infrastructures
and moves to the operational integration or
interoperability of systems. It is also spurring efforts
to adapt the oversight framework.124 FSR • Post-market infrastructures and financial stability  • November 2002
3|1 Difficulties arising from
the expansion of cross-border
transactions
Limits on intermediation in cross-border
transactions
Intermediaries, such as local agents, custodians and
global custodians proposing services in several
countries, handle most of the cross-border
transactions. Intermediation developed because of
the problems encountered by remote participants
regarding access to settlement systems and liquidity
in the country where the securities are located. The
problems are usually legal ones arising from the lack
of harmonisation in the legal requirements for access
to systems, which can sometimes exclude remote
participants, or technical problems relating to
incompatible communications protocols used
between different systems, for example.
However, excessive increase of intermediation can
create other risks. The processing chain for cross-
border transactions is considerably longer than the
chain for domestic transactions. This gives rise to
financial and operational risks, which means that the
default rate is much higher for cross-border
transactions. It also means that operations are less
efficient and the costs involved are higher.
The demand for more efficient cross-border systems
primarily led to concentration of transactions on a
limited number of institutions that have attained critical
mass. Custody is now highly concentrated in both
Europe and the United States. Custodians are now so
large that they have developed their own quasi-systems
for settling transactions between their customers
internally under conditions that are comparable to
those of multilateral settlement systems.
These internal quasi-systems sometimes handle more
trades and more trading value than the systems of
traditional operators, such as national and
international central securities depositories, although
there are few such examples in the euro area.
Supervisors need to pay full attention to these internal
quasi-systems.
Specific risks incurred in cross-border
transactions
The risks associated with cross-border links between
securities settlement systems are greater than the
sum of the risks associated with the individual
national systems. The risks are both specific and
complex. There may be legal risks relating to conflicts
of laws, especially with regard to transfer of
ownership, and complex operational risks may arise
since cross-border links require special operations to
realign and reconcile positions and accounts.
System operators need to take these special risks
into consideration when they establish cross-border
links between systems.
(a) Investors : insurance companies, pension funds, individuals, etc.
Traditional settlement of cross-border transactions through the securities
settlement system versus internal settlement through the local custodian
Case of a securities purchase
Investors (a)
Domestic market:
Global custodians Asset managers
Brokers
Internal settlements Remaining external settlements
Local custodian:
Cash correspondent Local broker
Securities settlement system:
Settlement agent Central securities depository
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3|2 Europe's solution:
consolidated infrastructures
Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union opened
up the prospect of a unified domestic securities
market within the euro area. There is still much to
be done to achieve this objective. The obstacles
highlighted by the Giovannini Report have yet to be
overcome. These include the lack of legal and tax
harmonisation, fragmentation of infrastructures and
inadequate cross-border mechanisms.
But, with the advent of the single currency, business
alliances and mergers have substantially changed
the securities business in Europe.
European integration models
Several solutions have been implemented to
consolidate securities clearing and settlement
infrastructures, as well as trading systems. The
solutions are directly or indirectly derived from
three standard models:
– The first model features “vertical” integration of
trading, clearing and settlement, which in its
strictest form enables partners in the same
system to deal with each other exclusively. In
this case the system is referred to as a “silo”
structure.
– The “horizontal” model is based on clearly
identified functional blocks that are established
at each stage in the securities processing chain,
without any obligatory links between them.
– Other arrangements combine horizontal and
vertical integration by linking entities providing
comparable services in different countries. These
structures allow users to choose which entity's
services they will use at every stage in the
processing chain for their securities transactions,
without sacrificing the transparency or
integration of the process and without imposing
exclusivity. The links between Euronext 6,
Clearnet and the Euroclear group are examples
of this type of arrangement.
In addition, the merger between Euroclear and Crest
announced in July 2002 should increase the pace of
post-market infrastructure integration in Europe.
In addition to the cross-shareholding deals and
mergers currently under way, various initiatives are
being undertaken to ensure interoperability of
independent systems. This means making it possible
for one system to link up to complementary systems,
generally located in other countries, to offer users
transparent cross-border operations without
requiring special technical adaptations.
Requirements for operational integration
Business alliances and mergers, regardless of the
forms they take, are only the first step towards
rationalisation of securities processing in Europe.
These moves are required for financial integration
in Europe because they simplify the legal
organisation and ownership of infrastructures, but
on their own, they are not enough. The important
aspects to be dealt with next are operational in
nature.
The second stage of the rationalisation process,
which is the operational and technical integration
of systems, is usually a more complex stage than
the consolidation of the legal entities that run the
systems. When the planned system is intended to
handle cross-border transactions, the legal
soundness of the new arrangement must be verified
beforehand. Risk management arrangements need
to be harmonised and the technical characteristics
of integrated systems must ensure reliability while
being suited to the users' needs. All of the recent
mergers have involved plans for integrating systems.
6 Euronext : structure before integration of the Portuguese stock exchange and Liffe
Two basic models
Exchange A – Exchange B
Central counterparty for









system for Exchange C
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Infrastructures are being reengineered in many
different ways all over Europe. Yet, regardless of the
organisational models used, all of the systems must
achieve standardisation and automation of all of their
processing chain so that they can implement straight
through processing (STP). The introduction of STP
will create a fully automated securities processing
chain and eliminate the need for intermediate
manual operations, which disrupt information
processing flows and give rise to errors. The
introduction of STP in Europe would make post-
market systems more efficient. It would speed up
the settlement cycle and create an integrated
European financial market.
Under these circumstances, the harmonisation that
would be preferable in the worldwide context
becomes critical in the European context. Systems
cannot be made to communicate efficiently and
safely if their operating rules are too different. For
example, a system offering settlement at the start
of the day or continuous settlement may not be able
to connect to a system that provides only
end-of-day finality of settlement. Such disparities give
rise to risk and inefficiency.
In this regard, the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations and
the guidelines laid out by the securities industry
representatives in the G30 call for full dematerialisation
Impact of the Euroclear –
Crest merger
The Euroclear group, which already provides
securities settlement services in France and the
Netherlands, and partly in Belgium and Ireland,
has announced its merger with its British
counterpart CrestCo. The merger will create the
largest securities settlement system in Europe. In
the medium term, it should make European
settlement systems more efficient by offering users
a single account for managing French, British,
Irish, Belgian and Dutch securities and by
charging about the same prices for cross-border
transactions between these markets and for
domestic trades. Ultimately, a fully integrated
securities settlement system should be created.
This will be a major step towards establishing an
efficient and integrated European financial
market.
Example of combined horizontal
and vertical integration Links
between Euronext / Clearnet
/ Euroclear in 2002
Euronext is the result of the merger of the Paris,
Amsterdam and Brussels stock exchanges in
September 2000. In January 2002, Euronext also
absorbed the Portuguese stock exchange and the
London derivatives exchange, LIFFE. The group's
holding company, Euronext NV, has a subsidiary
in each of these countries and each subsidiary
has clearly defined responsibilities.
Clearnet is a French credit institution that is a
subsidiary of Euronext and Euroclear. Under
French law, it is the central counterparty for all
of the trades on the Euronext spot and derivatives
markets. The ongoing expansion of Clearnet's
activities to Belgium, the Netherlands and, when
the time comes, to Portugal is being carried out in
a two-stage process. The first stage started with
the merger of the clearing houses on 1 February
2001. This made Clearnet the central counterparty
in each of the three markets. This stage marked
the beginning of a transitional period during which
risk control arrangements will gradually be
harmonised. The transitional period will end with
the deployment of the Clearing 21 system
developed by Clearnet. It will replace the existing
clearing systems in the Netherlands, Belgium and,
when the time comes, in Portugal. At the end of
the second stage, the risk management
arrangements will be fully harmonised.
Delivery versus payment for securities trades and
custody of collateral put up for Clearnet will be
handled by the securities settlement systems of
the Euroclear group, which has been designated
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of securities issues, harmonisation of communications
protocols and interoperability of settlement systems.
The ESCB/CESR group believes that straight through
processing will be a critical catalyst for the securities
business in Europe. Consequently it has made
implementation of STP a top priority for the
adaptation of the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations to
the European environment.
3|3 Harmonisation of standards
and co-ordination of supervisors
in Europe
It is up to the market to determine the best form of
consolidation and the best way to achieve
operational integration, but these changes must be
made in compliance with certain key principles.
More specifically, the main euro area market
infrastructures must be located within the euro area,
in view of their systemic importance. They must
have an appropriate oversight framework, as stated
by the Eurosystem on 27 September 2001. Locating
the infrastructures within the euro area is better
from a regulatory point of view and for maintaining
financial stability. It will also help the Eurosystem,
in its capacity as the euro “central bank”, to ensure
smooth operation of payment systems and effective
implementation of monetary policy. The
consolidation of post-market infrastructures in
Europe will obviously require changes in the way
the oversight authorities carry out their tasks. These
changes include the transposition of the
CPSS/IOSCO recommendations into the European
framework and the development of co-operation
agreements between authorities for the supervision
of cross-border systems.
Adapting the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations
to the European framework
The harmonisation of risk control arrangements for
post-market systems in Europe and co-operation
between authorities will be facilitated by the work
of the joint Working Group of the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR), which
started in October 2001.
The Group's work focuses on three areas:
– deepening and strengthening the CPSS/IOSCO
recommendations for application in the European
context,
– analysing central counterparty clearing activities
in Europe,
– reviewing the Report published in early 2002 by
the Giovannini Group (in charge of advising the
European Commission on financial market
issues), in order to reduce the barriers to  the
integration of European securities clearing and
settlement infrastructures highlighted in the
Report.
As part of the Group's work, the first question put
to the authorities concerns the scope of their tasks.
Up until now, the supervisory policies of regulators
and central banks applied mainly to clearing and
settlement systems run by specialised operators,
such as central counterparties, national and
international central securities depositories. The
concentration of the custody business, which has
come with keener competition, has brought new
players into the field. These players operate their
own quasi-systems that have functional
characteristics very similar to those of traditional
clearing and settlement systems.
This change has created a market-led demand for
the same oversight arrangements and the same sets
of standards to be applied to the same category of
services, even though providers do not all have the
same legal status. This is called the functional
approach. If the supervisory authorities adopt this
type of approach, it would become a complement
to the standard institutional approach. It would help
to create a truly level playing field in terms of
systemic oversight. The various authorities are
currently studying the requirements for adopting a
functional approach to their tasks that is in keeping
with the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations, which set
out recommendations for each category of service,
without reference to the types of providers.
The second issue for the authorities concerns access
to infrastructures and the right of these
infrastructures to develop their business in other
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dealt with in the main European Directives on
financial matters, such as the Banking Directives or
the Investment Services Directive. At the end of May
2002, the European Commission started public
consultations to determine whether a Framework
Directive is required to define an authorisation
procedure and a special status for securities
settlement systems, clearing houses and custodians,
and, if so, what the practical procedures for a
“passport” for such service providers should be.
Another important issue deals with procedures for
co-operation between domestic authorities as cross-
border systems develop. Central banks usually
oversee cross-border post-market infrastructures
according to the same principles as those applied to
payment systems (Lamfalussy principles). These
principles are based on designating a “lead overseer”
with the primary responsibility for overseeing the
cross-border system. This responsibility usually goes
to the central bank in the country where the system
is legally established. The other central banks
concerned (i.e., the central bank of  countries whose
currencies or securities are processed by the system,
and of countries in which a large number of
participants are located, or which are host to some
or all of the technical infrastructure), also take part
in oversight tasks through a consultative committee.
Co-ordination of European supervisors
within the context of Euronext and Euroclear
The supervisory authorities from the various
countries concerned have reached a formal
agreement on co-ordinated monitoring of securities
clearing and settlement in response to the
consolidation of financial markets and securities
infrastructures. The creation of Euronext and the
expansion of the Euroclear group have recently led
to application of the co-ordination principle.
At the end of January 2001, the French, Belgian and
Dutch authorities adopted a Memorandum of
Understanding that co-ordinates their respective
responsibilities for regulating and overseeing
Euronext.  The first part of the Memorandum of
Understanding was signed on France's behalf by the
French Securities and Exchange Commission  —
Commission des opérations de bourse — and the
Financial Markets Council — Conseil des marchés
financiers. It organises regulation of trading in
securities and derivatives within the Euronext group.
The second part of the Memorandum of
Understanding, which the Financial Markets
Council, the Banking Commission and the Banque
de France signed on France's behalf, deals with the
co-ordinated oversight of Euronext clearing
activities, which are handled by Clearnet.
Co-operation on the oversight of Clearnet is based
on the principle of mutual recognition of each
authority's powers that is derived from European
law. Co-operation is aimed at instituting joint
assessments of Clearnet's risk management
arrangements, with each authority maintaining
responsibility for taking the decisions within its
powers under its own institutional framework.
Another Memorandum of Understanding was signed
on 22 October 2001, by the National Bank of Belgium
and the Belgian Banking and Financial Commission
on behalf of Belgium and by the Financial Markets
Council and the Banque de France on behalf of
France. This document organises the prudential
supervision of the Euroclear group’s entities
Euroclear Bank and Euroclear France, as well as the
oversight of the group's securities settlement
systems. This Memorandum of Understanding
differs from the preceding one in that it is based on
the principles of international co-operation between
central banks for the oversight of payment systems
set out in the 1990 Lamfalussy Report.
A third Memorandum of Understanding with the
Belgian and Dutch authorities was signed by the
Financial Markets Council and the Banque de France
on behalf of France in 2002. It organises co-operation
for prudential supervision and oversight of the
securities settlement services provided by Euroclear
Bank for trades on Euronext markets.
These three agreements testify to the progress made
on achieving effective co-operation between
authorities in the performance of their supervisory
tasks as systems become increasingly
internationalised and pan-European post-market
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There have been substantial changes in post-market infrastructures in recent years. These changes
have been accelerated in Europe by the introduction of the single currency.
The authorities have kept pace with the changes, especially the central banks, which have made a
significant contribution to the definition of harmonised standards and co-operation arrangements
that ensure the effective and non-redundant oversight of new cross-border infrastructures.
Other initiatives will soon be introduced. The joint work of the CESR and the ESCB will mark a new
and decisive step towards achieving harmonisation of market practices and standards, and will
speed up the integration of post-market infrastructures in Europe.